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Myanmar and North Korea have had a complex relationship since the 1990s. In the 2000s especially,
the two countries’ military ties, including North Korea’s sale of missile technology and assistance in the
construction of underground defense facilities in Myanmar, have caused international and regional
concerns. 
 
While bilateral relations between Myanmar and North Korea have not always been easy, the challenges
and struggles the two countries each faced have brought them closer. As pariah states shunned by the
international community for their severe human rights violations and facing sanctions and embargoes
by the West, the two countries managed pragmatically to meet each others' needs. For example, the
Tatmadaw — Myanmar’s military — was intent on bolstering its military strength and defense
capabilities and North Korea was receptive to helping to achieving this goal.  
 
From the end of Korean War to 1974, Myanmar and North Korea conducted relations in an unofficial
setting. In 1975, the two countries established formal diplomatic relations. However, bilateral relations
turned sour in 1983 when three North Korean agents attempted to assassinate the visiting South
Korean president, Chun Doo-hwan, in Myanmar. The assassination bombing killed 17 members of the
South Korean delegation and 4 Burmese citizens. Myanmar immediately suspended bilateral relations
in response. Since the resumption of relations in the early 1990s, a barter agreement between the two
countries has allowed for Myanmar to export rice, rubber, and timber in exchange for North Korean’s
military technology and equipment, which allegedly included ballistic missile systems and
conventional weapons. 
 
Ties between Myanmar and North Korea reached their peak when the two countries restored full
diplomatic relations in 2007. The following year, Lieutenant General Thura Shwe Mann, the Joint
Chief of Staff of the Myanmar Armed Forces, traveled to Pyongyang where he signed a memorandum
of understanding and solidified military-to-military cooperation. Many countries, especially in the
West, were concerned with the growing ties between Myanmar and North Korea in the late 2000s. The
relationship was seen as gravely destabilizing and threatening to international and regional security.
And as Myanmar began making political reforms and diversifying its foreign relations starting in 2011,
the United States made it clear that Myanmar needed to sever ties with North Korea in return for
greater engagement and economic sanctions relief. 
 
With Myanmar looking to mend its relationships with the West and improve its international
reputation, maintaining its diplomatic and military ties with North Korea was counterproductive. The
question however remains: to what extent is the Tatmadaw willing to cut ties with North Korea for the
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Between 2013 and 2017, the targeted sanctions on the Tatmadaw in response to its weapons trade with 
North Korea signaled the West’s displeasure at Myanmar’s relations with North Korea. The quasi-civilian 
government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi has responded by demonstrating its willingness to cut ties with 
North Korea in a number of ways. These include signing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons (TPNW) in 2018 and expelling North Korean diplomats in accordance with the UN sanctions. 
Myanmar’s civilian government is strongly demonstrating its resolve to act in accordance with the 
international community in terms of relations with North Korea. 
 
Despite the efforts of the elected civilian government, independent reports and investigations note that 
the Tatmadaw has continued to maintain its relations with North Korea. As recently as 2017, there were 
reports of North Korean instructors at the top military academies in Myanmar, suggesting that the 
Tatmadaw has ignored the civilian government’s plans and continued to maintain its relationship with 
North Korea. 
 
On the other hand, and seemingly contradictory, Tatmadaw representatives in Myanmar’s Parliament 
supported the government’s decision to sign TPNW. They were in favor of signing the treaty in order to 
clear the cloud of suspicion by the international community of its nuclear and military ties to North 
Korea. “If we sign this agreement, this will clear up the past accusations against our country and the 
Tatmadaw. Besides, this will also contribute to our country being able to use nuclear energy peacefully,” 
said Lieutenant-Colonel Zaw Tun Oo, a military representative to the Lower House. 
 
While Myanmar’s civilian government may not see a benefit in continuing relations with North Korea 
due to international pressure, many in the Tatmadaw see the situation differently. Arms trade with 
North Korea provides the Tatmadaw with necessary weapons and equipment. 
 
Myanmar’s civilian government also has very little oversight of the activities of the Tatmadaw, and may 
not be aware of the remaining ties the Tatmadaw has with North Korea. Even if the civilian government 
is aware of the specifics of the Tatmadaw’s relationship with North Korea, it does not have many options 
in dealing with the issue. 
 
The Tatmadaw operates independently of the civilian government, which makes it extremely 
challenging for Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government to terminate ties the Tatmadaw has with North 
Korea. For Myanmar’s civilian government, maintaining a working relationship with the Tatmadaw is 
just as important as improving its foreign relations with the West. Indeed, in the wake of the Rohingya 
crisis and renewed pressures on Myanmar’s civilian government and military from the West, North 
Korea is not an issue on which the two can afford to strongly contest each other. 
 
Going forward, it is expected that Myanmar’s civilian government will respond well to the international 
pressure and incentives when it comes to limiting its relationship with North Korea. The extent to how 
successful it will be will rest in the hands of the generals in the Tatmadaw. 
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